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The American Express Opinion, Tech Platforms & the Rule of Reason 
 
Tim Wu† 
 
 This commentary on the U.S. Supreme Court’s American Express opinion is 
limited to two points (readers unfamiliar with the decision can read the summary in the 
margin).1 
 
   First, in my view, the American Express opinions in both the Supreme Court and 
Second Circuit exemplify an unfortunate trend in the antitrust law: a tendency to elevate 
theory over evidence.  There is some irony in this trend: there was a time, at its height 
during the 1970s and 80s, that critics charged the antitrust with too much pro-
government bias and an indifference to realities of economy.  That movement yielded 
the well-known turn toward a more evidence-based, “rule of reason” approach.  But 
today, in decisions like American Express, matters have come full circle, so much that 
courts in cases like American Express are once again willing to disregard evidence of 
anticompetitive harm in favor of abstract theory. 
 
 As such, Justice Thomas’s opinion in American Express can be seen as a mirror 
image of the per se rules that once prevailed throughout antitrust.  If those per se cases 
suggested an automatic victory for the plaintiff without evidence of competitive harm, the 
American Express courts have granted dismissal for the defendant even despite good 
evidence of such harm.  And as a result, American Express is an example from a retreat 
from from the evidentiary focus supposedly motivating the Court’s shift away towards a 
rule-of-reason analysis. 
 
 That’s the first point.  The second concerns the future impact of the decision.  
The Supreme Court’s opinion does have one great merit as compared to the Second 
Circuit’s:  it is narrow, indeed far narrower than some have suggested.   In particular, 
claims that the decision “immunizes” the major tech platforms from antitrust scrutiny are 
incorrect.2   It seems clear that firms like Google, Facebook, and Twitter are not covered 
by the American Express opinion, as explained here.   
 
 It is true that an opinion creating rules for all two-sided platforms would have 
fundamentally changed much of antitrust law, by reaching so much of American 
                                               
† Julius Silver Professor of law at Columbia University Law School.   I wish to thank Nicole 
Fleming for research assistance. 
1 The case concerned the legality of American Express’s use of “antisteering provisions.”  The 
provisions are contractual rules meant to prevent merchants who accept American Express from, 
nonetheless, steering consumers toward cheaper options (i.e., those with lower merchant fees).  
The Justice Department and seventeen states sued American Express based on the premise that 
the rules inhibit competition and prevent cards with lower fees, like Discovery, from gaining a 
competitive advantage by lowering their prices.Though the government won at the trial level, see 
United States v. Am. Express. Co., 88 F.Supp.3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015),  American Express 
prevailed before the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court.  Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 
2274 (2018). 
2 To the degree that any writings with my byline may suggest otherwise, I remind readers that the 
author does not control his headlines. 
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commerce.  For the concept of a two-sided platform is open-ended enough to 
conceivably describe businesses as diverse as malls, sports leagues, real estate agents, 
stock exchanges, and most tech platforms.3  The Second Circuit’s alarmingly open-
ended ruling in favor of American Express shows the need for careful treatment in this 
area.4   
  
 But the Court emphasized that credit-card companies are so-called “transaction 
platforms,” a subset of two-sided platforms.5  The opinion goes on to define transaction 
platforms as those that can’t provide a service to one side of the market independently—
those that, by necessity, facilitate a “simultaneous” interaction between the two sides.6  
As such, according to the Court, transaction platforms only compete with other 
transaction platforms.7    
 
 That limitation makes American Express inapplicable to most major tech 
platforms as well as most of what are traditionally called “two-sided” platforms.  
Consider, for example, two firms of much interest in the present discourse: Facebook 
and Google.  While both firms, roughly speaking, have business models based on 
bringing together different groups—advertisers and users—they don’t exist for the sole 
purpose of facilitating simultaneous transactions between the two.  Users do plenty of 
things on Google or Facebook outside of transactions with advertisers, such as 
interacting with other platform users, conducting searches, and so on.  For that matter, 
the American Express opinion would not cover a nightclub that offers a subsidized 
“ladies’ night”—the textbook example of a two-sided platform8—given that the nightclub 
doesn’t facilitate a “simultaneous” transaction between the male and female customers, 
and offers more than just the facilitation of such transactions. 
 
 Of course, there are major tech platforms whose existence seems predicated on 
facilitating simultaneous transactions and little more.  An obvious example is ride-sharing 
                                               
3 Shopping malls bring together shoppers and stores.  Geoffrey G. Parker & Marshall W. Van 
Alstyne, Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design, 51 Mgmt. Sci. 
1494, 1495 tbl.1 (2005).  Stock exchanges bring together equity purchasers and listed 
companies.  Id.  Residential real-estate agents bring together home buyers and home sellers.  Id.  
Travel reservation websites like Expedia, Travelocity, and Orbitz bring together travelers and 
hotels, airlines, and rental car services.  Id.  Sports leagues bring together fans and advertisers.  
Helmut Max Dietl et al., A Contest Model of a Professional Sports League with Two-Sided 
Markets, 232 J. Econ. Stat. 336, 337 (2012). 
4 See infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
5 Id. at 2280 (“[C]redit-card networks are a special type of two-sided platform known as a 
‘transaction’ platform.”) 
6 Id. at 2280–81 (defining a “transaction” platform and noting that “no credit-card transaction can 
occur unless both the merchant and the cardholder simultaneously agree to use the same credit-
card network”). 
7 Id. at 2287 (“Only other two-sided platforms can compete with a two-sided platform for 
transactions.”) 
8 See, e.g., Parker & Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 1495 tbl.1 (listing “ladies’ nights” as an 
example of a two-sided market, as the bars or restaurants act as an intermediary that brings 
together men’s admissions and women’s admissions); Julian Wright, One-Sided Logic in Two-
Sided Markets, 3 Rev. of Network Econ. 44, 45–50 (2004) (illustrating fallacies that arise from 
applying the logic of one-sided markets to two-sided markets, using “ladies’ nights” at 
heterosexual nightclubs as an example of the latter).  
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companies such as Uber, Lyft, and their brethren.  However, that said, it is not entirely 
clear that American Express offers a defendant something ultimately all that different 
than what the defendant already might have presented as a pro-competitive justification 
under the rule-of-reason analysis.  This further suggests that American Express is a 
case of limited long-term import. 
 
 A final point relates to the slightly unpredictable impact of the American Express 
ruling.  By suggesting that the only competitors to two-sided transaction platforms are 
other two-sided transaction platforms, the logic of the decision may sometimes yield very 
narrow market definitions.  Consider, for example, a hypothetical merger of ridesharing 
services Uber and Lyft, and assume, for a moment, that both are “transaction platforms.” 
If their only competitors are other two-sided ridesharing operations, then taxis and other 
forms of competition might be excluded, yielding higher market shares and making any 
potential merger more likely to violate the Clayton Act. 
 
 All this goes to underscore the essential folly of the decision.   By mixing in 
unnecessarily complex economic principles into the decision, the courts are creating an 
antitrust law in which generalist courts, wary of the rule-of-reason’s balancing, might  
cherry-pick a new economic theory for each case so as to yield the result preferred.  
That has the impact of dragging the law further and further away from anything 
approaching the competitive realities of the industry in question. 
 
1. Rule-of-Reason Analysis in American Express 
 
 The American Express opinion should be understood in the broader context of 
the last several decades and the ruse of “rule of reason” antitrust.    As any student of 
antitrust knows, there was a time when American law broadly took various forms of 
restrictive agreements as categorically, or per se anticompetitive.  Such agreements, 
including many forms of vertical agreement, were categorically condemned without any 
inquiry into their purpose or effects.9  But over the last forty years, antitrust doctrine has 
retreated from per se rules and moved toward the “rule of reason” analysis for most 
categories of alleged anticompetitive conduct.10  The reasons for this shift are relevant to 
the American Express decision. 
 
 The attack by courts on per se rules came from a desire that antitrust law 
analysis be more deeply grounded in evidence. As adopted by the courts, and in the 
                                               
9 See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 
Iowa L. Rev. 1207, 1213–14, 1219–20 (2008). 
10 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (“The 
rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of 
§1.”); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively applies rule of 
reason analysis. . . .”); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[M]ost antitrust claims are 
analyzed under a ‘rule of reason[]’. . . .”); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 
49 (1977) (“Since the early years of this century a judicial gloss on this statutory language has 
established the ‘rule of reason’ as the prevailing standard of analysis.”); Michael Carrier, The Rule 
of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827, 828 (2009) 
(“The rule of reason is even more crucial today than it was a decade ago.  The Supreme Court 
has increasingly overturned per se rules of illegality.”) (footnote omitted). 
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hands of more thoughtful critics, the movement away from per se rules was not 
premised on a blanket tolerance of potentially restrictive vertical agreements.  Rather, 
courts sought proof—and in particular, proof of harm to competition. 
 
 Take, for example, the problem of vertical pricing restraints, also known as retail 
(or resale) price maintenance.  Such restraints might serve the salutary purpose of 
promoting peace among retailers or protecting a value-added retail model.11  But these 
benign motives are not the only possible explanation.  Courts and commentators are 
also willing to consider that what is facially described as merely a means for ensuring 
peace among retailers may turn out, on further investigation, to an anticompetitive 
scheme.  For instance, the restraints could be the means by which the retailers to create 
their own pricing cartel.12   The premise of a rule-of-reason analysis is to find, as 
opposed to assume an answer, or so Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.13 suggests.  Leegin and similar cases promised 
antitrust law that was smarter than per se rules were—antitrust law that targeted only 
proven harms to the competitive process. 
 
 American Express violates that promise—not explicitly, but in its method.  After 
inviting the government to present evidence of harm under a rule-of-reason framework, 
the Court effectively moved the goalposts at the point of appeal, demanding something 
far more challenging to prove.  In other words, it suggested that direct evidence of harm 
to competition was not enough.  In that undertaking, the Court committed the same 
mistakes that the vertical per se rules did at their worst, by choosing to ignore evidence 
in favor of theory.    
 
We can show this more explicitly by considering the steps in a rule of reason 
analysis and how they interacted with the American Express litigation.  The prima facie 
rule-of-reason case under Section 1 of the Sherman Act asks the plaintiff to show two 
elements: proof of an agreement in restraint of competition, and proof of an 
anticompetitive effect.14  In the burden-shifting analysis, the defendant may then offer 
procompetitive rationales.15  The fact-finder—i.e., the trial court—then determines 
whether the anticompetitive effect on competition was demonstrated. 
 
 The antisteering provisions are a facially restrictive agreement designed—
successfully—to insulate American Express against competition from other credit card 
providers at the point of sale.  This was no secret.  American Express sought to prevent 
merchants from steering consumers toward less expensive alternatives, and in that 
                                               
11 See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 280–89 (1st ed. 1978). 
12 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893 (describing the risk of vertical price restraints being used to 
organize cartels at the retail level); see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 
752, 765–66 (1983) (describing behavior that would amount to a retail cartel).  
13 In holding that vertical price restraints should be judged under the rule of reason, Justice 
Kennedy emphasized the importance of evidence in determining the effects of the restraints.  See 
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889–90 (explaining that vertical price restraints may be procompetitive in 
some cases but anticompetitive in others, and discussing various kinds of proof a court might use 
to reach either conclusion).  
14 See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶1502 (4th ed., 2017). 
15 See id. 
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manner, prevent the company from losing market share to cards with lower merchant 
fees.  For pro-competitive rationales, American Express justified the restrictions by 
arguing that its business model depended on both higher merchant fees and more 
benefits for its cardholders.16 
  
 At the American Express trial, the government presented significant evidence 
tending to support the premise that the antisteering rules did inhibit price competition 
between credit card companies.17  For instance, as Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, 
the antisteering provisions stifled the attempt of a competing credit card company to 
innovate in favor of lower prices.18  Discover tried a business model during the 1990s 
that offered much lower fees to merchants.19  But the antisteering provisions of American 
Express and other credit-card companies meant that merchants couldn’t communicate to 
customers a preference for Discover.20  Over time, Discover ultimately gave up on price 
competition and decided to raise its merchant fees as well.21  This outcome tends to 
suggest a failure of the competitive process along with an industry-wide lack of price 
discipline.  
 
 Importantly, American Express’s practices suggested that it felt little or no 
competitive pressure to lower its prices.  The company was able to raise its prices 
twenty times during the disputed five-year period without losing the business of any large 
merchants, suggesting further that its antisteering rules affected competition.22  This 
outcome is not surprising, given the intent of the restrictions.  
 
 Nonetheless, if the Second Circuit or Supreme Court believed that American 
Express should have won based on the evidence, the appropriate remedy within the 
rule-of-reason framework would have been to credit American Express’s procompetitive 
justifications.  The courts could have found the district court too dismissive of the 
importance of the anti-steering rules to its distinctive business model.  The appellate 
courts could have concluded that the anticompetitive antisteering rule was, despite 
harming competitive, nonetheless justified because it made possible the company’s 
particular model of prestigious, reward-intensive card.    
 
 Yet they did not, as we’ve seen, and instead opted for a far more confusing and 
theoretically complex approach.23   Why take a more complicated approach?  While one 
can only speculate, one reason is that the Courts may have been wary of the “balancing” 
called for by the rule of reason after a procompetitive rationale is credited.24  Literature 
                                               
16 See United States v. Am. Express. Co., 88 F.Supp.3d 143, 224–38 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
17 Id. at 238. 
18 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2293–94 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
19 See Am. Express. Co., 88 F.Supp.3d at 213–14. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 195–97. 
23 Because the Court found that the government had not proven anticompetitive harm per the rule 
of reason’s first step, it did not reach the second step of crediting the defendant’s procompetitive 
justifications.  See Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. at 2290. 
24 Judges are often not comfortable with the task of balancing harms and benefits in antitrust 
cases. C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 927, 
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suggests that courts are uncomfortable with such balancing to the point that they almost 
never do it.25  Sometimes courts avoid the challenge of balancing by using the “less 
restrictive alternative” test: comparing the action to a hypothesized alternative and 
asking whether the alternative action is “less restrictive” and hence less harmful.26  
Perhaps, then, the strange path taken in the American Express case was a reflection of 
that anxiety. 
 
 Instead of balancing, the Court disposed of the case by adjusting the market 
definition for transactional platforms to include “both sides” of the market.27  This creates 
an incoherent market.  Market definitions are determined by evaluating available 
substitutions,28 yet somehow the credit card market includes services that could not 
possibly be substitutes.  (How can cardholder and merchant services be 
interchangeable?)  Perhaps more charitably, it redefined the product as the entire 
transaction, yielding a market for transaction facilitators, and then searched for 
evidence—on appeal—that competition between networks had been damaged.   
 
  The fact that this demand regarding the market definition was imposed on 
appeal is important.  Had the government known it needed to shown harm to competition 
with that market definition, it might have done so.  Even taking into account a better 
ability to reach consumers, the government could argue that the antisteering rules were 
still anticompetitive.  But none of this was developed at trial.  Instead, the Court’s 
approach allowed it to make its own de novo findings. 
 
 At bottom, the approach announced the Court is unprecedented, procedurally 
indefensible, unnecessarily complex, and ultimately incoherent.  The per se rules were 
at least honest about what they were doing.  Their mirror-image counterpart in American 
Express takes the less-appealing approach of using complex economic theory to create 
near-impossible burdens of proof—burdens particularly hard to meet when they emerge 
on appeal. At worst, they offer a highly jazzed-up way of getting around some awfully 
damaging facts. 
 
 The danger inherent in the American Express decision’s deviation from the rule 
of reason lies in its arbitrariness.  As everyone knows, it is nearly always possible to 
                                               
947–951 (2016).  As Hemphill suggests, they are generalists who see antitrust cases 
comparatively rarely; they have a limited fact-finding capacity, which is hampered by the 
adversarial nature of antitrust litigation; and they can sometimes feel as though the values at 
stake are incommensurable.  Id. 
25 For instance, a study of 222 rule-of-reason cases (decided by judges as opposed to juries) over 
a decade showed courts disposing of 97% of cases at the first stage of the burden-shifting 
framework, on the grounds that there was no anticompetitive effect.  See, e.g., Carrier, supra 
note 20 at 828–829.  Judges balanced in only 2% of the cases.  Id. 
26 See Hemphill, supra note 36 at 952–55 (describing how judges turn to the less restrictive 
alternative test due to anxiety about balancing). 
27 Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. at 2286. 
28 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956) 
(holding that the relevant market must include all products “reasonably interchangeable by 
consumers for the same purposes”).  
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manipulate market definition to justify deciding a case in a particular direction.29  The 
existence of direct evidence of harm to competition serves as one of the checks on that 
possibility.  The promise of cases decided on the basis of good, direct evidence is at the 
core of the rule of reason, as discussed earlier.  But if a court can ignore direct evidence 
of harm to competition by demanding something else be proven, the whole analysis is—
once again—open to the whims of the judiciary.   Any case can be decided by adopting 
an economic theory tailored to the facts at hand, yielding  
 
 All this said, the Court’s deviation from a typical rule-of-reason analysis also 
limits its relevance as a decision.  The five justices in the American Express majority 
certainly did not overrule landmark cases that describe the rule of reason and how it is 
meant to function, such as Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States,30 
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,31 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (BMI),32 California Dental Association v. Federal 
Trade Commission,33 and Leegin.34  To the contrary, the American Express decision 
claims to be following the rule-of-reason framework.35  Accordingly, the case ultimately 
falls in the category of what a Supreme Court clerk would call “fact-bound error.” 
 
2.  “Transaction Platforms” in American Express 
  
 As already mentioned, the American Express holding is much narrower than it 
might have been.  The Second Circuit and some amici suggested an approach that 
could have had sweeping implications by potentially establishing a new form of market-
definition analysis for any case involving a two-sided platform.36  And the concept of a 
two-sided platform is expansive.  Consider that businesses at issue in many landmark 
antitrust cases could be thought of as two-sided platforms.  An oil refinery like that in 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States brings together crude oil producers and 
gasoline buyers;37 a rights association like that in BMI brings together composers and 
media outlets;38 a sports league like that in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. 
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma brings together sports fans and sponsors;39 
an operating system like that in United States v. Microsoft Corp. brings together 
                                               
29 See, e.g., Jones v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 334 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1964) (“[T]he term 
‘relevant market’ is a rather evanescent term which can be skillfully manipulated somewhat in the 
manner of an accordion.”); Louis Altman & Mark Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, 
Trademarks, and Monopolies, § 4:31 (4th Ed.). 
30 Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
31 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
32 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. (BMI), 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
33 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
34 Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
35 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (stating that “like nearly every other 
vertical restraint, the antisteering provisions should be assessed under the rule of reason”). 
36 The Second Circuit opinion addressed two-sided platforms more generally.  See United States 
v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 185–186, 196–200 (2nd Cir. 2016). 
37 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 32–33 (1911). 
38 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. (BMI), 441 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1979).  
39 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88–89 
(1984). 
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application makers and computer users.40  Hence, a decision applicable to any two-
sided platform might have shaken American antitrust law to its core. 
  
 Instead, the American Express holding is limited to “transaction platforms,” 
explicitly excluding “nontransaction platforms” from its analysis.41  This narrow approach 
may have reflected discomfort from members of the majority as well as an unwillingness 
to explicitly overrule prior cases.42  The term “transaction platform” is new to antitrust,43 
but the Court defines it as a two-sided market in which the platform “facilitate[s] a single, 
simultaneous transaction between participants.”44  This means platforms that, by their 
nature or design, offer only services of simultaneously conducting a transaction between 
parties on each side of the market—platforms that “cannot sell transaction services to 
either [one side or the other] individually.”45  In such a setting, the Court reasoned, 
platforms “exhibit more pronounced indirect network effects and interconnected pricing 
and demand.”46 
 
 The limitation is still abstract but suggests that the American Express decision 
wouldn’t apply to most two-sided markets, and in particular, wouldn’t apply to most major 
tech platforms.  Accordingly, some of the claims about the case’s relevance to the tech 
field are overstated.  As described above, an enormous range of firms operate what 
might be called two-sided platforms, but only a small subset are transaction platforms.    
 
 To take a few important examples, firms like Google, Facebook, and Twitter are 
not covered by the American Express opinion.  Their business models depend on 
attracting users and ultimately reselling their audiences to advertisers.47  Users do plenty 
of things on each of these platforms that doesn’t involve making a transaction with an 
advertiser.  Indeed, the lure of Facebook and Twitter is actually interactions with other 
users, while Google, in its original conception, primarily offered a means of finding 
content on the web.   
 
To that end, by the Court’s own implication, Google, Facebook, and Twitter are 
covered by the rule of Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States48 and not 
American Express.  The Court makes this point clearest in a footnote distinguishing 
“nontransaction platforms” (and also implicitly recognizes the existence of attention 
                                               
40 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51–54 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
41 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2285–87, 2287 n.8 (2018). 
42 For instance, the Court had previously ruled that for analyzing a two-sided platform in the case 
of a newspaper, dominance in one side of the market—not both—is key.  See Times-Picayune 
Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 610 (1953) (holding that for a newspaper, a “dual 
trader” connecting advertisers and readers, “dominance in the advertising market, not in 
readership, must be decisive in gauging the legality” of the conduct).  In contrast, in American 
Express, the Court used a newspaper to illustrate the concept of a nontransaction platform.  See 
infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
43 A Westlaw search for federal and state cases that used both the terms “transaction platform” 
and “antitrust” returns nothing prior to the June 2018 American Express decision.  
44 Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. at 2286. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See Tim Wu, Blind Spot, The Attention Economy and the Law, Antitrust L. J. (forthcoming). 
48 Times-Picayune Publ’g Co., 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
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markets49): “Nontransaction platforms, by contrast, often do compete with companies 
that do not operate on both sides of their platform.  A newspaper that sells advertising, 
for example, might have to compete with a television network, even though the two do 
not meaningfully compete for viewers.”50  Consistent with this, Times Picayune had 
established earlier that the market definition for a newspaper should focus on the entity’s 
dominance in advertising, not readership.51  The implication is clear for firms like Google, 
Facebook, and Twitter, which do compete for digital advertising but do not directly 
compete for users in the relevant attention markets: American Express only applies to 
firms that are both transactional and in competition on both sides of the platform 
 
 A firm like Amazon might seem at first like a closer case, given that the e-
commerce giant clearly facilitates transactions between its users and sellers.  That said, 
it seems clear that the Court in American Express could not have intended for every 
retail operation to be treated as a “transaction platform” in the meaning of the opinion.  
Stores that bring together buyers and sellers can face competition from stores that 
exclusively carry their own goods.  For example, Best Buy, which sells many brands of 
computers, still competes with the Apple store, which sells computers only of its own 
brand.  There is far more to the business of Amazon and other retailers than the 
simultaneous facilitation of a transaction.  Indeed, credit card companies are often the 
entities that complete the retail transaction, suggesting that they are distinct from the 
retailers themselves. 
 
 Among platforms of much antitrust discussion nowadays, the American Express 
decision would seem to be most relevant to Uber and Lyft.  Such ridesharing firms 
primarily owe their existence to the market for facilitation of transactions between drivers 
and riders.  So if Uber were accused of anticompetitive practices, American Express 
offers it an opportunity to argue that even in the face of direct evidence of harm, a court 
must take into account the goal (if any) of making Uber’s services more attractive to its 
passengers.    
 
 Imagine that Uber sought to hurt its rivals in the competition for drivers by trying 
to sabotage Lyft’s recruitment of new drivers.  (A real-world example: In a ridesharing 
version of the “ding-dong ditch,” Uber employees reportedly ordered and canceled 
thousands of Lyft rides to suggest to Lyft drivers that Lyft was unreliable.52) After 
American Express, Uber may be able to suggest that its conduct was ultimately in the 
interest of making its product more appealing to consumers.  Uber customers benefit 
from lower wait times if Uber has more drivers available.  It seems hard to argue that 
                                               
49 See generally Tim Wu, The Attention Merchants: The Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads 
(2016). 
50 Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. at 2287 n.8. 
51 See Times-Picayune Publ’g Co., 345 U.S. at 610. 
52 See Erica Fink, Uber's Dirty Tricks Quantified: Rival Counts 5,560 Canceled Rides, CNN (Aug. 
12, 2014), https://money.cnn.com/2014/08/11/technology/uber-fake-ride-requests-lyft/ (reporting 
on allegations by Lyft that Uber employees canceled 5,560 Lyft rides between October 2013 and 
August 2014); see also Laurie Segall, Uber Rival Accuses Car Service of Dirty Tactics, CNN 
(Jan. 24, 2014), https://money.cnn.com/2014/01/24/technology/social/uber-gett/ (describing 
similar allegations that Uber employees in New York canceled rides with Gett, a rival ridesharing 
application).  
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sabotaging a rival might accomplish that, but stranger arguments have been made in 
federal court. 
 
 As this illustration suggests, what American Express offers Uber in terms of a 
defense is not really all that different from the rule of reason’s procompetitive rationales.  
This further indicates that much of the mess created by the American Express case 
could have been minimized: If the appellate courts were convinced that the antisteering 
provisions actually benefited competition among cards as between consumers, they 
should have found “clearly erroneous” the district court’s assessment of American 
Express’s procompetitive justifications.  Just as hard cases make bad law, so does a 
fear of the rule of reason’s balancing.  
 
 The Uber-Lyft discussion also helps demonstrate some of the unpredictable 
implications of the American Express decision.   The Court suggests that two-sided 
transaction platforms really only compete with each other, and not with one-sided 
businesses.  That points suggests that, in some cases, the Court’s analysis might yield 
much narrower market definitions that might ordinarily be the case.  It might suggest 
that, in a hypothetical merger of Uber and Lyft, that traditional competitors like taxis, or 
black cars are not actually competitors to the ride-sharing firms, yielding a much 
narrower market definition, and a higher likelihood of presumptive illegality.   All this 
underscores the inherent incoherence of the analysis. 
 
Afterword 
 
 At a public hearing of the Federal Trade Commission in 2018, panel members 
were asked whether the Microsoft case53 would have reached a different outcome if it 
had been decided after American Express.  Back in 2001, the D.C. Circuit found that 
Microsoft had maintained a monopoly in the operating-system market in violation of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.54  At the time, there was fear that Microsoft would kill the 
then-up-and-coming challenger Netscape, monopolize the browser market, and use that 
point of control to dominate the coming age of the web.55 
 
Factually, though Microsoft dealt with a two-sided platform,56 this alone would not 
be enough to assume that American Express would cause a different result.  As I’ve 
explained here, the American Express holding’s self-imposed limits suggest it is not 
directly relevant to two-sided platforms generally—only transactional platforms.  The 
operating system at issue in Microsoft is a two-sided platform, but not one of a 
transactional nature. 
 
                                               
53 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
54 Id. at 64, 71, 74, 78.  Early on, it seemed like the remedy would be for Microsoft to be broken 
into two companies: one for the Windows operating system and one for other products.  See 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.Supp.2d 59, 64–74 (D.D.C. 2000).  Ultimately though, the 
company was allowed to stay whole, albeit with some limitations on its behavior.  See United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. Civ. A. 98-1232, 2009 WL 1348218 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009) 
(modifying the judgment for a second time).  
55 Richard Blumenthal & Tim Wu, What the Microsoft Antitrust Case Taught Us, N.Y. Times (May 
18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/opinion/microsoft-antitrust-case.html. 
56 See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 51–54. 
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 But of course, in another way, American Express could have procedural 
consequences.   In cases like this, the Court is creating opportunities for appellate courts 
to work around the Justice Department and a district court that have turned up clear and 
unmistakable evidence of harm to competition.  Any halfway-decent lawyer can find an 
economic theory that could account for all but the most blatantly anticompetitive acts.  At 
that point, a court—if allowed to convert a procompetitive justification into a burden of 
proof—gains a new way to dismiss any case.  For example, in Microsoft, a hostile 
appellate court might have demanded proof not just that Netscape was excluded (and 
hence that competition was compromised), but to prove the impossible: that the entire 
ecosystem was damaged as a consequence, or something along those lines.  American 
Express suggests that a judge can keep demanding more proof, in concentric lines, until 
the government’s lawsuit collapses.   
 
 Here we have the opinion most pernicious attribute.  At bottom, it offers appellate 
courts the comfort of the Supreme Court’s support in finding novel ways to throw out 
antitrust cases with strong evidence of anticompetitive effects. 
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